The paper examines the context of the first introduction of the concept of 'cultural capital' in the sociology of education analyses undertaken in the early 1960s and published by Bourdieu in collaboration with Jean-Claude Passeron in 'Les étudiants et leurs études ' (1964) and Les Héritiers (1964). It first considers the cultural contexts within which Bourdieu's thinking about culture originated -both in relation to his social origins and in relation to his intellectual training. It then examines the extent to which Bourdieu's early anthropological research in Algeria was influenced by his knowledge of American acculturation theory. It concludes that Bourdieu sought to use acculturation theory in a distinctive way -one which he articulated more confidently as he explored the relationship between agency and structural explanation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The specific educational researches which stimulated the articulation of the concept of 'linguistic' or 'cultural' capital belonged to the period in which Bourdieu was only just beginning to refine his post-structuralist philosophy of social scientific explanation. To use these concepts now involves deploying them reflexively in accordance with Bourdieu's later thinking rather than at face value as they were first developed during the period in which he and Passeron were 'apprentice' researchers. The form of Bourdieu's studies reinforced a separation of the intellect from primary experience, whilst the content of those studies provided him with a philosophical discourse in which to articulate this dual experience. To put this in Husserlian terms, Bourdieu was interested both in the competing discourses of objective sciences and in the pre-predicative intentionality upon which all scientific discourses are dependent.
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The origins, development and status of Bourdieu's concept of 'cultural capital'.
The cultural contexts for the development of Bourdieu's concept of culture.
To explore Bourdieu's concept of 'cultural capital', I need to go back to his beginnings. His post hoc representation of his upbringing was that he had been raised in divided worlds. There are passages in An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology in which Bourdieu reflected on the way in which, like Flaubert, he had acquired the capacity to think objectively about his personal experience as a result of being sent at an early age to a boarding school (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, 205) . Equally, in
Language and Symbolic Power, Bourdieu drew upon his childhood experience of a linguistic division between the Béarn dialect of the home and the French of his schooling (Bourdieu, 1992, 68-9) . Whether or not this was post hoc theorising about his youth, whether, in other words, there had been an experiential division which had generated a dualistic conceptualisation or whether the conceptualisation was read back into his experience, is not certain, but the fact remains that Bourdieu's thinking was always characterised by a duality between what one might call natural, familial, domestic, or traditional culture on the one hand and artificial, acquired, constructed or public culture on the other. This duality was reinforced institutionally. It was a duality between regional, provincial, or indigenous culture and metropolitan, centralstate, or colonialist culture, or, more generally and philosophically, between the 'lifeworld' and the 'system-world'. It was a duality which Bourdieu was to seek to transform into a dialectic.
The character of Bourdieu's social and intellectual trajectory is well known. He admitted to having read Sartre without being an existentialist, and to having read Heidegger and Husserl. Internal evidence suggests that he was greatly influenced by the work of Merleau-Ponty. Although Bourdieu only mentioned his reading of early Husserl, again internal evidence suggests that he was familiar with some key texts of Husserl which were published posthumously -The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Husserl, 1970) and Experience and Judgement (Husserl, 1973) . Bourdieu was simultaneously interested in the philosophy of science and neo-Kantian epistemology and in the phenomenological project which subjected objectivist science to criticism. Bourdieu became interested in Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms as versions of Kantian categories which implied that he was interested in competing, socially constructed forms or explanatory discourses rather than in a priori, transcendental categories. He seems to have been influenced more by phenomenological method than by the claims of transcendental phenomenology which means that he took method from the early Husserl but was more sympathetic to Husserl's late attempt to accommodate historical and social contingency. In all of this, Bourdieu's philosophical orientation was functional or instrumentalist. He had no interest in speculative philosophy. His philosophical reading provided him with a language with which he could talk objectively about the dualities of his experience.
The form of Bourdieu's studies reinforced a separation of the intellect from primary experience, whilst the content of those studies provided him with a philosophical discourse in which to articulate this dual experience. To put this in Husserlian terms, Bourdieu was interested both in the competing discourses of objective sciences and in the pre-predicative intentionality upon which all scientific discourses are dependent.
Bourdieu had acquired the artificial culture of philosophical discourse but he used that discourse to articulate the differences between the ontological and the epistemological, natural being and socially acquired knowing.
Another point to make about Bourdieu's beginnings is that he was intellectually formed in a tradition which paid little attention to the analysis of culture. There was no tradition that corresponded with the Kulturgeschichte or Geisteswissenschaft of the German tradition. Comte made no separate space for cultural analysis. Cultural phenomena were objects to be understood positivistically and possessed no distinctive truth claims. As we know from Bourdieu and Passeron's "Sociology and Philosophy in France since 1945" (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1967) , the problem for them was that Comte had been attached to a realist philosophy of science. Applying Einstein to the social sciences involved the recognition of functional relations rather than substantive entities. The theory of relativity had ousted Durkheim's Comtist commitment to the analysis of 'social facts as things', but relational analysis gave no more privileged status to cultural phenomena than had realist positivism. Methodologically, in fact, there was some distinct affinity between phenomenology, positivism and logical positivism and Bourdieu was predictably unsympathetic to Dilthey, to Rickert, to Weber's theory of charisma, to intuitionism or to hermeneutics. His reference to
Gadamer at the beginning of The Rules of Art (Bourdieu, 1996, xiv) is a late example of this hostility. It was not part of Bourdieu's training to isolate the study of autonomous culture. In so far as 'culture' was an issue, Bourdieu would have been more interested in the legacy of Bergsonian vitalism and in Merleau-Ponty's attempt, notably in The Structure of Behaviour (Merleau-Ponty, 1965) , to engineer an encounter between the pre-logical and processes of biological adaptation. In short, Bourdieu was interested in the encounters between the cultures of persons rather than in cultures for themselves. He described how his initial purpose in his Algerian researches was to explore philosophical positions empirically and, in particular, to carry out a 'phenomenology of affective life' (Bourdieu, 1987, 16; 1990, 6-7) . "Though the discussion of the necessity for obtaining reconstructions of the earlier life of a people has here followed that of the need for the description of their life as it is lived at present, there are cases where the wisest practice in the actual study of acculturation would seem to be to derive the base-line from which the changes developed first, and then, once equipped with the insight into past conditions, to obtain relevant data concerning the contemporary manner of living. Where such a course is followed, the evaluation of changes that have occurred as a result of contact will be surer, and an understanding of the effect had by the forces operative in the situation of change more clear, than if the present-day culture is first studied without reference to the past." (Herskovits, 1938, 25) However, Herskovits's underlying assumption became apparent in his attack on 'applied anthropology'. He criticised the tendency of some anthropologists to become partisan in their analyses of, especially, culture contacts occurring in the context of colonialism. Herskovits singled out Richard Thurnwald's Black and White in East Africa (1935) , quoting Thurnwald's assertion on the first page of his book that "At no time in the history of mankind has a clash of nations, peoples, races, and their cultures, traditional prejudices, interests and abilities taken place like today." (Thurnwald, 1935 , 1, quoted in Herskovits, 1938 Herskovits's contention was that 'contacts of the sort now occurring between nationals of colonizing governments and native peoples are of no different order than those that have certainly occurred since recorded history began -and perhaps since mankind has inhabited the earth -…' (Herskovits, 1938, 30-1) . In focusing on the particular, applied anthropologists ran the risk that they failed to analyse the universal dimension of the phenomena they were studying and, consequently, failed to generate 'science'. Herskovits was provoked by his dislike of applied anthropology to define the proper nature of anthropological science in the following way:
"A basic justification of ethnological research is that it gives a broad background against which to judge our own rules of behaviour, and a more inclusive view of human cultures than can be attained by any other social discipline. This is because it alone offers data against which we can project customs peculiar to ourselves and, in the manner of scientific research, test generalizations arising out of the study of the patterns of our culture by seeing whether or not these generalizations have validity when applied to peoples whose customs have no historical connection with our own." (Herskovits, 1938, 31) Bourdieu's distinctive adaptation of acculturation analysis.
I don't want unduly to labour these references to Herskovits, but the extent to which Bourdieu differed from Herskovits in respect of the status and function to be assigned to social science, or differed radically from Herskovits in relation to the philosophy of social science, is important for my argument about the origin, development and status of Bourdieu's concept of 'cultural capital'. Herskovits can be seen as a protostructuralist, deploying empirical, inductivist procedures to generate universal laws of culture contact. This was the function of science and to be successful it was essential that the scientist should be hors de combat -conceptually and institutionally objective and detached. Although Bourdieu had not fully articulated his position at the time of his Algerian fieldwork, nevertheless he was explicit in his first book that the stimulus for his study was the 'clash of civilizations' which he was observing and experiencing during his military service in Algeria. Unlike Herskovits, Bourdieu was not interested in extrapolating scientific truths from his observations but, importantly, this does not mean that his analyses were partisan. He strove to produce a functional objectification. It was functional on two levels. Sociologie de l'Algérie was an objective account of traditional social organization which served as a base-line to guide the practices of indigenous researchers who constituted the team of assistants working on the two subsequent empirical analyses of 'modern' Algerian society. It was designed therefore to be immanently functional in helping Algerians to introduce the strengths of their cultures into the process of constituting the identity of a postcolonial, independent Algeria state. It was also designed to be cross-culturally functional. Bourdieu's Sociologie de l'Algérie was published in 1958 in the Que Saisje series of small, introductory texts produced by the Presses Universitaires de France. This was the same year that Camus re-issued some of his earlier journalistic coverage of poverty and suffering in Kabylia as Chroniques algériennes. (Camus, 1958 "The process of imaginary variation gives us the essence itself, the being of the object. The object (Objekt) is 'something whatever', for example the number two, the note do, the circle, any proposition, a sensible datum. We can vary it arbitrarily, … The essence or eidos of the object is constituted by the invariant which remains identical across the variations." (Lyotard, 1999, 12) To summarise very briefly, I am saying that Bourdieu regarded the discourses of the sciences as contrived language games which were alienated from natural culture.
This did not cause him to be reductive or sceptical but it did cause him to deploy these discourses, varying them imaginatively, so as to isolate essences which are want to spend some time on the two questionnaires because, obviously, the nature of the questions asked is indicative of the conceptual framework which was being deployed.
The first questionnaire had 52 questions. The anonymous respondents were first asked to specify nationality; civil status -single, married, or divorced; sex, date of birth; Faculty; University; date of entry to the Faculty. These elicited basic personal details with a concentration on the respondents' institutional locations. There Bourdieu and Passeron remarked in conclusion that "A collection of researches which had as its first object to grasp attitudes towards the School and scholastic culture was therefore able legitimately to restrict itself to the active student population." (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964a, 10)
The first object of the research, in other words, was to analyse the variety of attitudes amongst students towards academic values and institutions. It was only in the last paragraph of the general introduction that Bourdieu and Passeron admit that their differentiation of attitudes related primarily to differentiation on the basis of social origin. Their sociology of culture sat unhappily on a sociology of social origin which was stripped of objective class differentiation. I want to continue to explore this tension between social and cultural analysis because it seems to me that it is at the heart of what should be our contemporary discussion about the relationship between cultural capital and social exclusion. In the last paragraph, Bourdieu and Passeron wrote:
"Given that the social origin of students seemed to us to be the principal factor of differentiation, we wanted to grasp its action in different domains by moving from the most obvious like living conditions to the most hidden like cultural practice and attitudes towards scholastic and non-scholastic culture.
The specialists are agreed in accepting the influence of social origin on the behaviour, attitudes and opinions of students without always being capable of bringing to light the collection of mechanisms, particularly the most sly and subtle ones, by which it is exercised." (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964a, 10) What is methodologically grasped as social differentiation is viewed in its various manifestations to such an extent that Bourdieu and Passeron are actually analysing the ways in which cultural differences consolidate or even constitute those social differences. The research was not designed to establish that cultural differences were the consequences of different social origins, reflecting a prior social reality. Instead, it was designed to show that social and cultural differences are inseparable and that, through time, the social which is synonymous with natural or indigenous culture, is modified by degrees of initiation into artificial, acquired culture. Les étudiants et leurs etudes anticipates La Distinction (Bourdieu, 1979 (Bourdieu, , 1984 To evaluate accurately the force of these factors of differentiation, we must bear in mind that they do not act in the same conditions. It is in the student milieu that the differences which adhere to social origin have the most chance of being neutralised since students have, by definition, suffered, over a long period of years, the homogenising action of scholastic discipline. That is why the student milieu offers a privileged field of study since the differences that can be grasped there, especially the most subtle ones, demonstrate a fortiori the influence exercised by the milieu of social origin as a factor of cultural inequality." (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964a, 13) In other words, Bourdieu and Passeron were most interested in examining the phenomena of social differentiation and they acknowledged that to study students as a sub-group was to take an element of the population where the effects of differentiation by reference to acquired culture would conceal the indigenous differences within the whole population. It is clear that their orientation was to analyse differentiation.
Implications for following Bourdieu's practice. (Bourdieu, Darbel & Schnapper, 1966 , 1990 ) -and the process of aesthetically consecrating the everyday practice of photography -Un art moyen (Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel, & Chamboredon, 1965 , 1990 . It could be said that these were projects (and texts) which anticipated Bourdieu's attempt of the 1970s to develop a procedure for understanding the reciprocal dynamics of cultural grass-roots agency and institutionalised cultural conservation and that these attempts were, finally, at odds with a more conventionally static structural analysis as recommended by Passeron, whether in terms of socio-linguistic or social anthropological science.
It was the research project on 'Le Patronat' in the early 1970s which generated three important articles: "Les stratégies de reconversion. Les classes sociales et le système de l'enseignement" (Bourdieu, Boltanski & de Saint Martin,1973) ; "Le titre et le 7
The original French sub-title was Eléments pour une théorie du système d'enseignement, but the English title was probably justified by reference to the paper which Bourdieu gave at the Durham conference of the British Sociological Association in 1970 -"Reproduction culturelle et reproduction sociale" which was subsequently first published in English as "Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction" in Brown, ed., 1973. poste. Rapports entre le système de production et le système de reproduction" (Bourdieu & Boltanski, 1975) ; and the single-authored "Avenir de classe et causalité du probable" (Bourdieu, 1974) . These articles consolidated Bourdieu's relationalism, his intention to show how the variables isolated for analysis by social scientists are elements of the game of position-taking. This work was pursued in La distinction (Bourdieu, 1979) , Homo Academicus (Bourdieu, 1984) and La noblesse d'état (Bourdieu, 1989) . It is this understanding of the immanent dynamics of society which is lacking in some of the attempts which have been made to use Bourdieu's concepts socio-metrically. Detached observation was, for Bourdieu, one perspective to be adopted in social relations. "Avenir de classe et causalité du probable" was an article which pursued further Bourdieu's early consideration in the context of his Algerian research of the revolutionary potential of the sub-proletariat, but, more generally, it raised the question of the relationship between statistical projections generated by objective social scientists and the immanent life-chance projections of those social agents who are the mathematised objects of statistical analysis. It continued the exploration that had been undertaken in the same terms in "La fin d'un malthusianisme?" (Bourdieu & Darbel, 1966) in relation to the tension between the rational analysis of fertility rates offered in population studies statistics and the socially determined differential capacity of real people to exercise rational calculation in birth control. It ran in parallel with the discussion in "L'opinion publique n'existe pas" (Bourdieu, 1971) of the relationship between the characterisation of political opinions offered by political scientists by extrapolating from opinion polls and the socially differentiated profile of political attitudes distributed within populations.
People are situated at points on a spectrum extending from, at one extreme, possession of a-political, ethical, natural or indigenous dispositions, to, at the other extreme, acquiescence in pre-digested positions advanced by party political machinery. As the title of "Avenir de classe et causalité du probable" suggests, Bourdieu discussed in detail the relationship between 'mechanism' which supposes that actions are the manifestations of prior conditions, and 'finalism' which supposes that actions are directed by future-oriented projection. To register this tension had always been the significance of Bourdieu's concept of 'habitus' which sought to provide a conceptual tool for comprehending that the capacity to project forwards which people really possess is understandable as a function of their prior social condition rather than in terms of abstract mathematical models. Some social conditions lead to the generation of abstract models but the explanatory value of these models is not universal but simply a function of the particular conditions of their generation which have to be weighted alongside the future projections emerging from alternative conditions. It is significant that Bourdieu's reflection on the relationship between natural and artificial cultures is mirrored by his reflection on the relationship between subjective meaning and objective reality. In both cases, Bourdieu's thinking was informed by his reading of Husserl on time. As he puts his position in "Avenir de classe et causalité du probable": "Economic competence is not then a universally and uniformly extended aptitude. The art of estimating and seizing chances, of seeing the future 'appresented' (as Husserl puts it to distinguish this from the imaginary future of a project) in the present configuration, the capacity to introduce the future by a kind of practical induction or even to play the possible off against the probable by a calculated risk, these are all dispositions which can only be acquired under certain conditions, that is to say in certain social conditions." (Bourdieu, 1974, 11) The essence of Bourdieu's 'reflexivity' which only gradually became fully articulated after the completion of the research which led to the conceptualisation of 'cultural capital' was that detached observation had to be situated in order to liberate an encounter between cultures possessing varying degrees of naturalness and artificiality . As Bourdieu recognized in "The Genesis of the Concepts of Habitus and Field" (Bourdieu, 1985) , we have to recognize the socio-historical contingency of concepts which functioned effectively at one moment but may not necessarily function similarly at a future moment -even when the past conceptualisation has in part constituted the present situation. In following Bourdieu's work in the present, we have to be careful that social inclusion arises from the articulation of difference and is not itself a mechanism of exclusion, a euphemisation of the social and cultural dominance of the already dominant. We have to be careful to ensure that, as social scientists, we are sensitive to the changing market of culture in which we participate and do not deploy the concept of 'cultural capital' statically -as an instrument of consecrated social science -in a way which might consolidate the social inequalities which it originally exposed.
